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In 1962 Bernard Crick., published In Defence of Politics. Aimed squarely 
at conceptions of politics organised around winner-takes-all platforms it 
mounted a spirited defence of negotiated settlement as the indispensable 
basis for a plural society (Crick 1962). As a recent commentary on Crick 
notes however, to operate successfully “the art of political horse- trading” 
has to be firmly grounded in “decent information, civility and conciliation”  
(The Economist 2017:11) 
These essential conditions for democratic politics were explored in 
another book, published in the same year, Jurgen Habermas’s The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1991). Both 
men had witnessed the devastating impact of Hitler’s politics of violence 
and both believed passionately in strengthening the twin pillars of 
democratic participation, voting and voice, representation and deliberation.  
Habermas sets out to trace the rise and decline of the critical public sphere, 
understood as the web of direct and mediated spaces where open 
deliberation on contentious issues is conducted in good faith , highlighting 
the challenge to this ideal presented by  the rise of “publicity merely staged 
for manipulative ends” [Habermas 1991:232] In a striking phrase, he 
characterises this as “a refeudalization of the public sphere” [opcit: 195], 
repositioning people as subjects, spectators at pageants of power ,rather 
than  citizens collaborating in constructing a collective future.  
He sees contemporary politicians following the feudal monarchs who 
promoted carefully crafted public personas through portraits on coins and 
spectacular events , displaying “a showy pomp” [p195] designed to create 
“the kind of aura proper to personal prestige”  [Habermas 1991:195]. But 
those seeking power in democratic polities cannot claim a divine right to 
rule. They need a popular mandate .To secure this , Habermas argues, 
they borrow the kingly practice of presenting themselves as servants of 
‘the people’, battling enemies without and within,  focusing their appeals 
on particularly on “ that minority whose state of mind is symptomatically 
revealed, according to survey researchers, in terms of an average 
vocabulary of five hundred words” [op cit:217].  
In pursuit of this goal Habermas observes , they by-pass established 
channels of mediated communication and rely on direct modes of address 
with the result that “press and radio, “deployed in the usual manner”, have 
practically no effect: within the framework of the manufactured public 
sphere” [Habermas 1991:217]. He sees the substation of emotion for 
evidence based argument in populist appeals as “especially manipulative” 
and patently self-serving since it calls for “predictable reactions 
without …placing any obligation whatever “ on those seeking “secure 
plebiscitary agreement” [opcit :217]. Once consent is obtained they can 
pursue interests concealed in their public discourse. 
Despite this bleak account Habermas concludes that “The outcome of the 
struggle between a critical publicity and one merely staged for 
manipulative purposes remains open” [Habermas 1991:235] . The 
election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum arguably point to a 
more pessimistic conclusion. 
The regression, from citizens to subjects, is reinforced under current 
conditions by the business model operated by the internet majors .To log 
on is to be enlisted as a labourer working in digital fields owned by the 
new feudal landlords who appropriate whatever data surplus is produced,  
Before writing The Structural Transformation of The Public Sphere 
Habermas worked at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and his 
analysis builds on the research produced by the Institute’s members as 
they struggled to analyse the corruption of deliberative democracy, initially 
in Germany with the collapse of the Weimar Republic and later in the 
United States. Their work remains an indispensable resource for 
understanding contemporary conditions. 
Lessons from Weimar: The Nazi Shadow.  
In January 1933 Hitler was appointed Chancellor and following the 
burning of the parliament building , introduced an Enabling Act granting 
him absolute power. A Marxist oriented institute had no future in Nazi 
Germany .It was closed and the building occupied by the Gestapo. 
Anticipating this the offices had been moved to Geneva and in 1935 
relocated to New York. Before these forced exiles however, Max 
Horkheimer , who had assumed the directorship in 1930, had established 
a significant body of research exploring the social and psychological roots 
of the authoritarianism underpinning Hitler’s popular support.  
The first major project was a questionnaire distributed to around three 
thousand workers. Drawing on the psychoanalytic training of the study’s 
main researcher, Eric Fromm , answers to useable replies were searched 
for key words and phrases that suggested underlying dispositions. 
Although only ten per cent of respondents could be classified as firmly 
committed to authoritarianism, only fifteen per cent were strongly ant-
authoritarian, leaving three quarters undecided and open to persuasion. 
Fromm resigned soon afterwards and plans to publish the results never 
came to fruition. A summary did appear however in the Institute’s more 
general analysis of the social and psychological roots of authoritarianism 
published in 1936 as Studies on Authority and the Family which, among 
other things,  presented popular compliance as a response to the social 
and cultural dislocation generated by economic depression.  
An earlier study, of routine white collar workers in Berlin , by the leading 
journalist, Siegfried Kracauer, had concluded that economic development 
had demolished ”The house of bourgeois values and feelings in which 
they used to live …leaving them “spiritually homeless” “(Kracauer  
1998:88). In a later analysis he saw this vacant cultural space colonised 
by cinema narratives crafting a “national epic [that] dwelt upon Prussia’s 
humiliation [and] her future redemption” led by an inspired Fuhrer 
(Kracauer 1947: 263) . There were counter narratives but as he noted “in 
the conflict of antiauthoritarian and authoritarian dispositions, the odds are 
against the former” (op cit:271). This was partly because social 
democratic programs were associated with decline and dislocation ,an 
argument  forcefully restated  by Franz Neumann, who joined the 
Frankfurt Institute in the United States .In his magisterial analysis of 
Hitler’s regime , Behemoth, published in 1944, he identified the Social 
Democratic Party’s failure  to “symbolize a vital and realistic policy” as a 
major contributing factor to her Nazi’s popular appeal (Neumann 1944:437) 
The context has changed but recent developments have invested this 
arguments with new relevance. The campaigns of Donald Trump in the 
United States and the Brexiteers in Britain spoke to the lived experience 
of three decades of declining living standards and the perceived failure 
the Democratic Party and New Labour to effectively contest the neo liberal 
ascendency that had created widespread insecurity and immiseration. 
Their campaigns  also articulated deep seated fears of declining national 
power and respect on the world stage, with Trump promising to ‘Make 
America Great Again’ and the leading Brexiteer, Boris Johnson exhorting 
Britain to ‘Let that Lion Roar’, a reference to the emblem of royal power in 
England since Norman times. In understanding the rhetorical building 
blocks on which these appeals were constructed and the communication 
strategies employed to promote them the work conducted by members of 
the Frankfurt group, in exile in the United States, continues to provide an 
indispensable starting point for analysis.  
Dispatches from the United Sates: Democracy and Demagoguery  
Hitler’s preferred modes of public address were expressly designed to 
establish a direct connection to his supporters. The meticulously 
orchestrated night-time mass rallies with their dramatic lighting and seas 
of waving flags offered a spectacular stage for his rhetorical performances 
As Walter Benjamin, a long- time associate of the Frankfurt Institute, 
noted , they were integral to a promotional apparatus that introduced 
“aesthetics into political life” offering spaces of “expression while 
preserving property “( Benjamin 1970:24 ). Those unable to attend could 
listen to the speeches on the radio, a medium whose potential for 
constructing an illusion of personalised communication Hitler had 
immediately grasped. 
He was not alone. For over a decade , from 1933 to 1944, the President 
of the United States, Franklin D Roosevelt, regularly addressed the nation 
on radio explaining the thinking behind his policies reproducing informal 
talk around the domestic dinner table, an intended intimacy anchored by 
the title, ‘Fireside Chats’. The commercial and competitive basis of 
American radio however, also opened it to a range of right-wing populist 
platforms. Their strident presence suggested that am established 
democracy might harbour the same authoritarian undercurrents that 
supported Fascism. Morris Janowitz who analysed the radio speeches of 
the right –wing populist politician Gerald Smith was in no doubt that he 
was “a dangerous manifestation of something deep in the American 
tradition” (Janowitz 1944: 84). In a rhetorical manoeuvre familiar from the 
Trump campaign Smith presented himself as “the under-dog candidate 
harassed and persecuted” by “newspaper lies” who would stand up for 
“the common people” against the corruption and  deceit of politicians and 
bureaucrats in Washington (Janowitz 1944: 90-91) . Earlier in his career, 
Smith had supported the most successful right-wing radio commentator of 
the inter-war years , Father Charles Coughlin  whose weekly broadcasts 
over a national network of independent  stations in the mid 1930s had a 
reach of over forty million.  (see Kay,Ziegelmueller and Minch 1998)  His 
speeches were analysed in detail in a pioneering study by Alfred and 
Elizabeth Lee published in 1939 (Lee and Lee 1939)    .         . 
The Frankfurt group contributed to debate on authoritarian populism’s 
capacity to subvert the democratic process with detailed analyses of a 
range of populist agitators and surveys of their popular support.  
Theodore Adorno had come to New York to work with Paul Lazarsfeld on 
the series of studies of the radio industry and its audiences. His initial 
focus was on music radio but he was struck by how similar the rhetorical 
devices employed by right wing commentators were to Hitler’s. When 
Horkheimer moved to California on health grounds Adorno joined him and 
began analysing the broadcasts of Martin Luther Thomas who had a 
strong base in evangelical Christianity (Adorno 2000). Although the 
enemies Thomas’ identified in his speeches were resolutely secular and 
located in the here-and-now, the promise that the faithful could be ‘born 
again’ if they renounced the named devils and all their works and 
embraced the true path he outlined , drew heavily on the fundamentalist 
world view .Adorno’s analysis remained unpublished at the time, but 
research on a wider sample of right wing appeals led by another member 
of the Frankfurt group , Leo Lowenthal , was published in 1949, under the 
title  Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American 
Agitator (Lowenthal and Guterman 1949). 
 
The speeches analysed revolved around two fundamental oppositions , 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and past and present, animated by an idealised 
national narrative of a society securely anchored in a common culture 
and shared values. This construction automatic labels “foreigness” as 
disruptive and corrosive and denounces any “plans to let new 
immigrants enter the country” (Lowenthal and Guterman 1949:50). 
These external threats were accompanied by visions of a fundamental 
breakdown of trust between rulers and ruled that played on popular 
suspicions that many elected representatives were in the pocket of 
lobbies catering to special interests. 
 
As the Frankfurt studies make clear however, authoritarian populism 
cannot be understood simply as a discourse promoting a particular world 
view. As Adorno noted, “Hitler was liked , not in spite of his cheap antics, 
but just because of them” (Adorno 1994:167). The American agitators he 
researched followed suit, aiming at “a performance reminiscent of the 
theatre” (op cit:166). “They give their admission-paying audience 
something between a tragical recital and a clownish pantomime-rather 
than a political speech. Discussion of political topics invariably serves 
them as an occasion for violent vituperation and seemingly irrelevant 
personal abuse” (Lowenthal and Guterman 1949:4). This studied 
“disregard for ‘appropriate ways of acting in the political realm” (Moffitt and 
Tormey 2014:392) mobilises a common language of condemnation and 
shared emotions of anger and outrage so that speakers appear “ like 
someone arising from its midst to express its innermost thoughts”  
(Lowenthal and Guterman 1949:5).Their  proposed solutions “may seem 
incongruous and morally shocking, but are always facile, simple, and final” 
(Lowenthal and Guterman 1949:9)  
Profits of Deceit :Trump and Brexit 
Donald Trump , Boris Johnson , the central figure in the Vote Leave 
campaign , and Nigel Farage the driving force behind the alternative 
campaign based around the UK Independence Party (UKIP) are all master 
showmen with distinctive performance styles. 
For the first fourteen seasons of its run on prime-time network television, 
Trump compered reality show The Apprentice with its signature catch-
phrase, ‘You’re Fired’. This exposure helped cement his claim to business 
acumen and decisiveness, but his performance style owes more to his 
association with the contests staged by World Wide Wresting 
Entertainment (WWE). As Roland Barthes famously noted, “The virtue of 
all-in wrestling is that it a spectacle of excess “(Barthes 1973:15). The 
2007 WWE ‘Battle of the Billionaires’ ,which pitched a wrestler 
representing Trump against an opponent representing his rival Vince 
McMahon, was a perfect demonstration. Following McMahon’s defeat 
Trump pretended to punch him while he was lying on the floor, shaved his 
head and showered the audience with dollar bills. As Naomi Klein has 
argued ”His carefully nurtured feuds with other candidates” during his 
election campaign “ were pure pro wrestling, especially the way he 
handed out insulting nicknames [and] played ringmaster at his rallies , 
complete with over-the-top insults …directing the crowd’s rage at the 
arena’s designated villains” (Klein 2017:52). 
Johnson and Farage are less histrionic but both have carefully 
orchestrated performative personas, Johnson as a dedicated patriot with 
a penchant for clowning and Farage as just an ‘ordinary bloke’,  an image 
he burnishes at every opportunity by insisting on being  photographed  in 
an English pub enjoying a pint of English beer .Johnson is more 
flamboyant. When the zip wire he was riding as part of the celebrations 
for a  British gold medal at the 2012 Olympics , jammed, suspending him 
in mid-air, he took the opportunity to wave the two small national flags he 
was holding for the benefit of the crowd looking up anxiously from below. 
As Adorno observed, “agitators are taken seriously because they risk 
making fools of themselves” (Adorno 1994:166)  
These performative styles have promoted populist motifs that Adorno and 
Lowenthal would readily recognise. Both Trump’s ‘America First’ slogan 
and the Leave campaign’s demand for Britain to ‘Take Back Control’ 
spoke to popular anxieties and resentments fuelled by deindustrialisation 
and  the increased transnational flows of migrants generated by neo 
liberal globalization. In response, they proposed two simple solutions: re-
imposing control over national borders and regaining sovereignty over key 
decisions. 
Lowenthal and Guterman had identified the ‘placeless’ refugee as the 
“ideal model for irreconcilability” at the heart of populist constructions of 
social disruption and cultural erosion (Lowenthal and Guterman 
1949:51).This motif occupied a central place in  both the campaigns 
discussed here. Nigel Farage was photographed standing in front of a 
billboard poster depicting a packed column of refugees from Syria 
approaching the border with the European Union. The composition and 
placing reproduced exactly a sequence from a Nazi propaganda film 
warning against “the parasites who flooded Europe’s cities after the last 
war” (Bartlett 2017). Under the heading ‘Breaking Point ‘ the Ukip poster 
evoked the same threat declaring that ‘The EU has failed us’ and now was 
the time to “take back control of our borders”. This same demand was 
central to Trump’s campaign with repeated promises to build a wall along 
the Mexican border and subsequent  attempts to capitalise on fears to 
jihadist attacks to ban citizens of named countries from entering the 
country.  
Alongside demands to police national borders more forcefully both Trump 
and the Leave campaigns championed the reassertion of  national 
sovereignty over key decisions affecting political and social life. No longer 
being subject to judgements in the European Court of Justice or to 
regulations introduced by European agencies was central to the case 
made for Brexit. For Trump putting ‘America First’ has entailed 
detachment from transnational agencies and agreements that impose 
obligations, most notably UNESCO and the Paris Climate Agreement.  
‘Taking back control’ also has a hard economic edge. Claiming that free 
trade agreements signed by the US have disadvantaged domestic 
industry, Trump has withdrawn from the Trans Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. During the Leave campaign the coach transporting Boris 
Johnson around the country displayed the prominent message, ‘We send 
the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead. Let’s take back 
control”. The figure was fictional but it spoke to the popular assumption 
that the relationship with the EU was a one-way street while posing as the 
saviour of the country’s most admired institution, the National Health 
Service. 
The Trump and Leave campaigns were successful but the margins of 
victory were relatively small. In Britain 51.89 percent of those voting in the 
referendum opted to leave the EU with 48.11 voting to stay. Hilary Clinton 
secured 2.9 million more popular votes than Trump  but his victories in 
key states secured sufficient Republican nominations to the Electoral 
College, which makes the final decision, to give him 57% of the votes and 
the presidency. Faced with these slim margins both Trump and the British 
government ,led by Teresa May, have repeatedly reemphasized their 
popular mandate and claimed that anyone who seeks to criticise or 
impeded them is disregarding the expressed will of the people.  
This opposition was dramatized in the starkest terms in November 2016 
when the High Court in Britain ruled that the decision to trigger the process 
of leaving the EU required the consent of parliament. The following day 
the leading right of centre national daily, the Daily Mail, denounced the 
judges as ‘Enemies of the People’ .On the 19 April , the day after Teresa 
May had called a snap election hoping to increase her parliamentary 
majority, The Daily Mail, carried the headline ‘Crush the Saboteurs’. 
Labelling opponents as ‘saboteurs’ and ‘enemies’ are classic populist 
constructions designed to reaffirm the absolute dividing lines between 
‘them’ and ‘us’ and leaders who champions the ‘people’s’  will and those 
seeking to deny it.  
To ensure that parliamentary opponents are rendered powerless Mr May 
has sort to use the so-called Henry VIII powers that originated with the 
Statute of Proclamations of 1539 and which enable the prime minister to 
approve amendments to laws by executive action, a major move towards 
the restoration of feudal authority. 
President Trump currently faces a similar impasse. Unable to progress his 
promised legislative agenda through the Congress and Senate, he has 
made extensive use of executive orders. By the end of his first hundred 
days in office he had signed a total of thirty two, more than any President 
since World War II. At the same time he has devoted considerable time 
and energy to shoring up his core base of support. 
As noted earlier, Habermas saw mainstream press and radio “having 
“practically no effect within the framework of the manufactured public 
sphere” (Habermas 1991:215).Faced with criticism from mainstream 
news media Trump has dismissed them as sources of ‘fake news’ 
designed to disparage him and refuses to address them. After two 
hundred  days in office he had held only one solo press conference , 
compared to Obama’s nine and Clinton’s eight at the same point. He can 
on support from right-wing internet sites led by the Breibart News Network , 
the self styled ‘platform of the alt-right’ but prefers to reach his supporters 
directly through mass rallies and posts on Twitter. 
Between taking office and the end of September 2017, Trump had spoken 
at nine mass rallies in his heartlands of support, attracting audiences of 
between 6,000 and 15,000. The populist performative skills displayed in 
his live appearances are matched by the immediacy of the vernacular 
speech of his Twitter posts. Between his inauguration and July 2017 he 
had posted over a thousand ‘tweets’ averaging 5.5 a day. With their 
grammatical mistakes and insults to opponents they mimic everyday 
arguments over current events in bars and workplaces and confirm 
Adorno’s characterisation of right wing populist speech’s provision of an 
“organised flight of ideas” in place of “discursive logic” (Adorno 1994:165). 
This communicative strategy produces a self- reinforcing circle with 
Trump’s twitter posts and rally performances being taken up and amplified 
in the media outlets favoured by his supporters. In place of a public sphere 
open to diverse positions this process channels  discussion into public 
sphericles (Gitlin 1998)  or echo chambers  in which information and 
argument selected according to a predefined position circulates with a 
closed space. The result is the destruction of deliberative democracy in 
which the attempted executive pre-emption of open debate in legislative 
chambers is matched by the subversion of the open deliberation required 
for the development of critical public opinion. 
This process is amplified by Facebook’s central role as a filtering 
mechanism directing  news and comment to users’ sites on the basis of 
profiles constructed from their on-line actvities. Both Trump’s presidential 
campaign and the Leave campaign in Britain made extensive use of data 
analytics to micro manage the placing a publicity and appeals on 
Facebook, reinforcing the self-enclosure of political debate and its 
separation into mutually antagonistic camps. 
As Habermas noted, the appeals that the architects of “the manipulated 
pubic sphere” devise  to “secure plebiscitary agreement”  place no 
“obligations whatever” on themselves (Habermas 1991:215). Both the 
Trump presidency and the push to uncouple Britain completely from 
European institutions are designed to reinforce a neo-liberal settlement 
that favours minimum regulation and restraint on business , relocates key 
decisions from legislative assemblies to corporate boardrooms , and 
continues to  transfer income and wealth from the bottom to the top of the 
social scale. .  
Even a cursory glance at the history of the Middle Ages however confirms 
that attempts to consolidate feudal rule were punctuated by periodic 
peasants’ revolts and popular protests against perceived injustices and 
the arbitrary exercise of power. Contemporary processes of 
refeudalisation which aim to translate citizens into audiences in theatres 
of power, applauding performances on cue, are being met with new forms 
of refusal and resistance intent on restoring spaces and practices of open 
deliberation and cooperative action. The future of democratic politics, as 
an arena of principled bargaining in defence of ideals of justice, equality 
and communality will depend on their success.    
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